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Th e Paradox of Aut] st] c AIL 
Certain autistic children whose linguistic ability is 
virtually non-existent can draw natural scenes from 
memory with astonishing accuracy. 
Figure, 
In particular their drawings display convincing perspective. In 
contrast, normal children of the same preschool age group 
and even untrained adults draw primitive schematics or 
symbols of objects which they can verbally identify. These are 
usually conceptual outlines devoid of detail. It is arguable 
that the difference between autistic child artists and normal 
individuals is that autistic artists make no assumptions about 
what is to be seen in their environment. They have not 
formed mental representations of what is significant and 
consequently perceive all details as equally important. 
Equivalently, they do not impose visual or linguistiC schema -
a process that we believe is necessary for rapid 
conceptualisation in a dynamic existence, especially when the 
information presented to the eye is incomplete. 
Naturalistic drawing skills are not essential to survival, but it 
is nonetheless a surprising fact that normal individuals 
cannot draw unless they are taught the tricks and schema to 
do so or equivalently unless they learn these tricks by trial 
and error or by using drawing aids.! The reason why this is so 
unexpected is that our brains obviously possess all the 
information required to draw, but we are unaware of this. 
( Alla" W. S"yder and Mandy Thomas) 
For example, our brains perform the necessary calculations 
for us to recognize and label objects and to recall sufficient 
detail to perceive subtle changes in familiar scenes. Indeed t it 
is clear that human vision itself reveals the artist's touch, Z yet 
we are not consciously aware of how our brain does so. 
This fact has frequently intrigued philosophers and 
historians of art. 
For example, Gombrich says, "One thing stands out from this 
story and demands a psychological explanation. It is that this 
imitation of visual reality must be very complex and indeed a 
very elusive affair, for why should it othenvise have taken so 
many generations of gifted painters to learn its tricks?"0ne 
trick, pertinent to our story, is to view the subject from an 
unconventional perspective, that is, one which has not been 
overlearned. 
Why is it then that we cannot draw natural scenes, not only 
from our rich visual memories but even when we are also 
confronted with a stationary landscape? Indeed, teachers of 
art admonish us for not observing what lies before our very 
eyes. Children especially draw not what they/see'but, rather, 
their own internalised schema for objects, schema which are 
surprisingly invariant across cultures.3 There is an appealing 
answer to this enigma. Our drawing difficulties may well be 
the by-product of strategies which have evolved to efficiently 
utilise a finite brain for rapid decision-making, particularly, as 
so often happens, when the information is incomplete. 
Indeed, it has been argued.! that scenes presented to the eye 
are not an unlimited succession of surprises, but rather 
conform to certain patterns. Thus, cognition would become 
more rapid and efficient if the brain had expectations about 
what is to be seen, and it would be plaUSible for these 
expectations to become incorporated into perceptual 
mechanisms. Now natural scenes, as distinguished from the 
infinity of contrived scenes, are composed of discrete objects. 
We would expect then that objects of particular importance 
or familiarity be granted privileged mental representations. 
Such visual representations are acquired through the process 
of overlearning as are the complex thought processes 
required for expertise within our nichet including fluency in 
language, complex social skills and even driving a car. 
Because all naturally occurring objects share common 
attributes, those studied through the ages by artists, we 
might also expect these more intrinsic properties to be 
structured into visual processing. 
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In summary, it could be said that the brain has mental 
representations that embody the salient or ecologically 
significant aspects of the environment. These allow for 
automatic complex actions. 
We can make some revealing predictions about a brain that 
accelerates its formulation of the percept by incorporating 
expectations about familiar or important objects. Firstly, this 
particular strategy of visual processing would reveal itself by 
faIling prey to musions or prejudices in contrived or 
unnatural situations. Indeed, errors in cognition are 
ubiquitous. Even assumptions about the more intrinsic 
attributes in common with all objects can cause illusions, as 
discussed fully elsewhere. Secondly, and most importantly, it 
is the object labels or symbolic identifications which are of 
ultimate importance, so we need not be aware of all (and 
thus unable to draw) the attributes and characteristics which 
are processed by the brain to formulate the label. For 
example, we are not consciously aware of why one face is 
recognizable over another, nor how we derive shape from 
shading, perspective from gradients of texture, size invariance 
with distance, etc. This strategy of visual processing is 
mirrored also in early linguistic skills whereby children tend 
to linguistically label objects long before they are conscious 
of the semantic nuances which differentiate one object 
from another. 
If the brain places emphasis upon expectations acquired 
through mental representation that is suggested above and, 
in particular, reports only the ecological aspects of objects to 
our consciousness, then we have advanced a long way in 
explaining our innate difficulty in drawing. But this raises a 
fascinating question. What are the characteristics of a brain 
that makes no assumption about what is to be seen? 
Equivalently, what would it be like if our minds did not 
possess mental representations that embody expectations? 
Suppose, instead that we were to make no assumptions 
whatsoever. 
A conceivable answer, we suggest, comes from the study of 
autistic children. Autism; is believed to be a developmental 
disorder and thus its behavioural ramifications vary with age. 
In its purest form, autistic individuals confront life as a series 
of surprises. A common feature of autistic children is an 
impoverished linguistic ability, for example less than ten 
words by age four. They appear to give attention to parts at 
the expense of the whole. Indeed, they can be very good at 
spotting abstract shapes embedded in a coherent pattern but 
have an inability to integrate or to make links. They observe 
the world without interpretation. 
un: Figure 1 Autistic child's drawing at about three and a half years. (taken from 
Reference I.) RIGHT: Figure I Representative drawings of normal children. each at 
age four yeaTi and two months. lEmma and Teneal. Parents on Campus Preschool). 
Figure 1 
They cannot work out what others think." Put simply, autistic 
children do not have expectations about this world and its 
dynamic interactions, Their mental representations have yet 
to be crystallized. 
Now recall our arguments above'which explain the difficulty 
of drawing as due to a by-product of our assumptions and 
expectations about the objects in our visual environment. 
Such expectations are incorporated by our mental 
representations. If this is true, then it would appear that 
natural drawing skills could potentially be found among 
autistic children because they apparently do not make such 
assumptions. Figure 1 shows that this is the case. This 
particular drawing7 was performed from memory by Nadia, a 
child of about three and a half. It is initiated at a seemingly 
arbitrary position and executed quickly without hesitation. 
No attempt is made to fit such drawings onto a page, they 
can end abruptly at the border. Furthermore, as the linguistic 
abilities of this (and other) autistic artist improved, her 
naturalistic drawing skills deteriorated. 
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All of this is consistent with the view that autistic preschool 
children can draw beciluse they lack fixed mental 
rcpresentJtions. Indeed, there is evidence that Nadia's 
mental images are occasionally mixed, allowing for subjects 
to be drawn from different angles. 
Although rare, similar drawings are characteristic of other 
preschool autistic child artists.A The rarity is due in part to the 
fact that autism often exists in parallel with other mental 
disorders' and these mitigate against drawing. Autistic 
preschool children are also notoriously difficult to motivate. 
They do not draw on request. Finally, no normal preschool 
child has been known to draw naturalistically, Figure 2 being 
representiltive of their draWings. Autism is apparently a 
necessary condition for a preschool child to draw an accurate 
detail of natural scenes. 
Some older autistic children (with language ability) have also 
been known to have exceptional drawing skills,lO but so do 
many normal children of the same age. In fact, children's 
drawings after age six are like adults in that they are all 
governed to a degree by conventions. ll Accordingly, we have 
deliberately restricted our study to younger preschool 
children. 
We have hypothesized that the brain has mental 
representations which embody the salient or ecologically 
significant aspects of the environment. As an example, 
normal preschool children draw rather schematic or symbolic 
representations in which shape is not enhanced with 
shading, gradients of texture are not used to create 
perspective and size is not varied with distance, etc. These 
sketches convey highly imposed or internalised meanings. 
They, along with early linguistic skills, I~ are consistent with a 
mind that is conscious of the objects themselves and not the 
object characteristics processed by the brJin to formulate the 
label or symbolic identification. All of this fits ne<Jtly into a 
strategy for making rapid decisions, particularly when 
confronted with incomplete information. Such strategies 
mitigate against naturalistic drawing. Cn contrast, Jutistic 
preschool children do not JPpear to impose expectLltions on 
their world and consequently, to them, every detail is of 
equal importance. Consequently, they are sometimes capable 
of curious skills such as drawing natumlistically, but at the 
cost of being able to make rapid decisions. 
Finally, there have recently been some fascinating advLlnces 
in our understanding of autistic art. 
Compelling evidence now suggests tW that everyone has the 
capability to draw like Nadia in Figure I, provided that part 
of their brain is switched off - the part that is responsible for 
forming concepts and making executive decisions. This 
controversial idea is also consistent with observations that 
artistic skills blossom in the early stages of demential> and 
that other unusual autistic-like skills occur following a 
sudden illness or accident 
Might it be possible for anyone to access his or her innate 
drawing skills by iutificialJy shutting off pJrt of their brJin? 
This hLls ilctually been suggested lfl and according to the 
March 2001 BBC documentary Fragments oJ Genius, is J reLll 
possibility. ® 
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